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 In the face of a relatively modest inventory of material possessions, the relational and 
communicative potentials of things are widely exploited by Urarina of Peruvian Amazonia. Like 
nature, things too can be “good to socialize” (Descola 1992), engaged in relations which shape 
personal identities and at once underscore their own person-like qualities. This article explores 
Urarina theories of materiality and personhood through a close analysis of two such relationships 
formed between humans and things. Regarded in certain contexts as more than inert matter but less 
than fully autonomous subjects, the lives of things raise ambiguities which challenge and thereby help 
to clarify the contours and outlines of local senses of the person. They further highlight aspects often 
neglected in earlier studies. While a focus on practices of conviviality and the particular concerns of 
medical anthropology have coincided in advancing models of the person that are, as I read them, 
grounded squarely in the body and in corporeal processes of substance exchange (e.g. Conklin & 
Morgan 1996; Pollock 1996; Conklin 1996; McCallum 1996), personhood for proponents of 
animism and perspectivism is more structural than processual, the outcome of internalized relations 
with alterity (e.g. Taylor 2001; Viveiros de Castro 2001; Vilaça 2002), and evidenced less through 
shared substance than the capacity for language (e.g. Descola 1994: 99). For the latter especially, 
the subject is treated as a „given‟ with the presence of a (universal) soul, rather than as the product 
of experience (e.g. Viveiros de Castro 1998: 471; Descola 1992: 114), a conflation which permits 
the recourse to dualist models (soul versus body, subject versus object) and overarching theoretical 
inversions (the former is the „given‟ in Amazonia, the latter is the „constructed‟). In all these 
approaches, bodies alone are social sites. The perspectivist subject is relational only insofar as it 
occupies the position of „predator‟ or „prey‟, and there is little room for gender or other types or 
degrees of subjectivity. Drawing on the Urarina case, this article points to a notion of subjectivity 
that is potentially available to both persons and things, is inherently gendered and relational, and 
does not presuppose the presence of a soul. Emphasising the importance of intimate but 
asymmetrical relations of dependency and control in the constitution of agency, it suggests a move 
away from associations between the „soul‟ as a „non-social condition‟ (e.g. Gow 2000:53), a 
cultural valorization of individual autonomy, and egalitarianism. 
 
The Economy of Companionship 
 
Amidst the ties of kinship which connect Urarina within and beyond the local community, 
relations of companionship (corijera or coriara) are constructed and dissolved. Unlike kinship, 
companionship is not elaborated primarily through bodily idioms; corijera means literally “shadow-
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soul-fellow.” Unlike the body soul (suujue), bound up in notions of hardness, interiority, and the 
“heart” (suujua) as the seat of thought and emotion, the shadow soul (corii) is associated with 
reflections, doubles and companions. Founded in complementarity and physical proximity, these 
informal but typically asymmetric ties last anywhere from the duration of a specific task to a lifetime, 
and embody a local philosophy of mutuality. “Everyone has a companion,” I was told, “otherwise 
they could not live in peace... No-one can live alone.” A companion may be “of the same 
race/group” or “of the same activity.” Birds accompany those who walk in the forest, advising 
through song on a range of topics from rising water levels to the imminent death of a loved one. 
Trees are classified into sets of companions reflecting species found together, or held in similar 
esteem: aguaje palms are the companions of shebon palms; mahogany is the companion of moena; 
lupuna is the companion of caupuri. Communicative facility and co-operation underpin the 
relationship. “Lupuna is always conversing with caupuri,” my informant explained, “they co-ordinate 
their work together... they are neighbors.” Large game animals are said to each have a special type 
of companion, known as cojoaaorain, which takes the form of a small bird who advises that animal 
on a daily basis. The bird is “like its soul,” and “for its protection,” warning of approaching predators 
and other dangers. Cultigens have companions “in order to produce.” Sweet potato, the companion 
of manioc, is the latter‟s “support” and “resistance,” and each helps the other to grow. “Without 
help, one cannot work.”  
A thing, too, can be a companion of another thing, provided the relation is one of likeness 
and proximity, but not identity. A sock‟s pair is its “other” (laucha) but never its companion. A 
canoe‟s companion may be another canoe, but necessarily one belonging to a different owner. 
Artifacts can be and often are considered the companions of humans, though the relation must be 
established through continual use and ever-increasing familiarity, until the identity of each entwines 
with the other. Things are not formally distinguished grammatically in the Urarina language from 
animals, plants or humans: there are no markers or pronouns for animateness or gender and no 
nominal classifiers. All may, on occasion, be attributed life (ichaoha), a Mother or Owner (neba or 
ijiaene), and an animal or vegetal soul (suujue or eeura respectively).1 Ultimately, however, it 
seems less the explicit attribution of such qualities which defines them as particular kinds of subjects, 
than attitudes held towards them and ways of speaking about or to them in particular contexts. A 
shaman‟s ceremonial breast band is credited with a vegetal soul (eeura) when first fabricated, but is 
considered to acquire a semi-autonomous subjectivity only after repeated use, when it displays 
affection for its owner by, for example, transforming into a boa and licking his face during healing 
sessions. Many such possessions which partake of their owner‟s personhood in some way, such as 
the ceremonial paraphernalia of a shaman, or the woven fan or cooking implements of a woman, 
remain inalienably connected to their owners even at death, and must accompany them to their 
grave. The ontological status of a thing is by no means self-evident, nor is it immune to change, and it 
is perhaps this temporal dimension which is of greatest importance in understanding the ambiguous 
position of things in Urarina social life. 
 
A Gift of Love: The Baby Hammock  
 
Among the most intimate of all companionships established by Urarina is that formed at the 
very outset of life between a newborn baby and its hammock (canaanai amaa). A baby enters the 
world in a highly vulnerable and ambiguous state of existence, and the fabrication and use of the 
baby hammock form part of an extensive series of parental interventions intended to form and fortify 
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its body, protect it from disease, and ensure its successful entry into full social personhood. The 
mother weaves the hammock from palm fibers (Astrocaryum chambira) just prior to leaving the 
purpose-built annex (jata) of palm leaves in which she gave birth and must reside with her child in 
isolation until its umbilical cord falls. Like the hammock into which the child is then immediately 
transferred, the jata is a protective environment designed to minimize contact with alterity, and a 
liminal space for the passage from one social status to another. When I once asked why a mother 
weaves the hammock, I was told simply, “because she loves her baby.” It is an act which 
materializes her maternal love, alongside relations with female kin who, during the term of pregnancy, 
present gifts of selected items from hammocks their own children have outgrown. Such gift giving is 
also a concrete expression of their love, and the two acts are linguistically identical (belaiha). 
Through this investment of labor and love, the hammock is identified with its maker as a partial 
extension of her person (cf. Erikson, this volume), explicitly intended to substitute for her as the child 
is progressively distanced from its mother.  
 The hammock is prepared for use, and the child for emergence from the birth annex, through 
the performance by the father or other male relative of a chant cycle known as the canaanai mitu 
baau. This blesses a preparation of achiote and the roots of a piri-piri plant with which the child and 
hammock are each subsequently painted, in order to “maintain the body” and protect it from harm. 
Performed through the night directly prior to the child‟s emergence and lasting up to several hours, 
the chant invokes an extensive repertoire of beings – from mythical ancestors to species of birds and 
fish to the sun, moon and celestial jaguar – with the aim of appropriating desirable qualities or 
relations. Prominent among these is acarera, “vitality,” “vital breath/strength” or “longevity.” The 
chant gradually builds up a compound identity for the child/hammock until it is, finally, the entire 
ensemble of vitalities which is painted, as the following extract indicates:  
 
 Never capable of dying   chabana baitenachara   
 The vitality of the iguana    leleno acarera  
 And the vitality of the child‟s spirit  rai corii acarera  
 Are being formed as in the womb  necoulucuna que 
 The boy‟s vitality    aine calabi acarera 
 Shall be painted with achiote   coiainaritiin ne 
  
 This jaguar     caa ataebuinae 
 Who dwells in the sky   cana ichoae que terequi 
 Tremendous beast    catojoaain cotabaji 
 Never passes to this earthly side  chabana necoerateein 
 Since the creation    necoaauna caje  
 Is never diminished    chabana netabatacajeein  
 And there not forgotten   nii baitenacai 
 
 As the child‟s spirit grows   nejoerate rai corii 
 Painting with achiote    coiane que 
 This collectivity of vitalities   acarera caa calauri  
 Shielded from dangers   elunai que  
 Painting the newborn     coiane ne najanoacoa 
 With piri-piri     cobiri que  
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 His vitality     rai acarera  
 Shall be painted with achiote   coiane que coiainaritiin ne   
  
 When not in the arms of its mother or sleeping in her bed at night, a newborn baby spends 
most of its time in the hammock, under constant supervision, for there are no baby slings or other 
carrying devices (see Figure 1). With time, the child‟s acarera is said to permeate the hammock, 
remaining there even when no longer in use, and painting both with achiote pre-empts this fusion. 
The hammock gradually forms an integral connection to the baby, a kind of “ensoulment” (see 
Santos-Granero and Miller, this volume) through which each becomes an extension of the other, and 
the hammock will not be reused by another baby once outgrown, but guarded by the mother until it 
deteriorates. In exchange for this investment of vitality, the hammock actively forms the child‟s own 
nascent personhood, a role prefigured by the performative force of the canaanai mitu chant. Of 
central importance is the hammock‟s rattle (torara), a heterogeneous collection of items affixed 
beneath the position of the baby‟s head. Its bulk is made up of dry hollow seeds and gourds whose 
primary purpose is to produce sleep-inducing “lullabies” (jororoa) as they swing to and fro. By 
means of a long, taut string wound through her toes, a simple rocking of the caretaker‟s foot keeps 
the hammock in constant motion. Sleeping is considered the ideal state for a newborn baby, and the 
rattle‟s lullabies are often augmented with vocalized versions, personalized by the caretaker, which 
implore the baby to sleep, often promising union with its mother (or father), recently departed for the 
garden or forest, by means of its hammock „canoe‟: 
 
 Come, lay in your hammock    chajaocha tijiquin 
 Sleep now child    sinira canaanai 
 Go and follow Mummy, child  chajaocha mama sacuniu canaanai 
 If you stay behind you will cry, child  nedai ne te chanatoriqui canaanai 
 The rain already closes in on her, child inae mama jourichaje elo canaanai 
 Go and call her, child    cotihaniu canaanai 
 Go and be together with Mummy  mama que tacaain cotihaniu 
 Come on, go in canoe, child    chajaera laulautoracha canaanai 
 Go laying and swinging, child  chajaocha tijitijico canaanai    
 
[INSERT: Figure 1] 
 
 The rattle‟s lullaby promotes more than sleep, for attached to the seeds and gourds is a 
diverse and often extensive collection of animal parts: bones, teeth, claws, beaks and tails, woven 
together with remnants of foreign goods such as empty bottles, disposable razors, plastic spools, 
mirror frames, and sewing kits (see Figure 2). Each is more or less explicitly associated with some 
useful quality to be instilled, evoking pan-Amazonian notions of the transmission of animal qualities: 
the shoulder bone of the sloth, for example, an animal said to rarely defecate, is attached to build a 
child‟s resistance to diarrhea; the tongue of the paucar bird to develop its vocal abilities; coati teeth 
to transmit this animal‟s ability to find honey and avoid snakebite. Snail shells might be tied to the 
rattle “so the baby‟s ear doesn‟t grow too big,” while tiny glass vaccination bottles collected from 
the visits of local health workers, wrapped in colorful cotton jackets, continue to build resistance to 
that particular disease. Many items are gender specific: spent shotgun shells, collected from kills not 
misses, promote hunting ability; packets of needles might be affixed to a girl‟s rattle “so she will 
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know how to sew - so she doesn‟t grow up useless,” and plastic combs so her well-brushed hair 
will remain free from lice. A single rattle may boast dozens of such components, the meaning or 
value of which can be idiosyncratic, or evident only to one familiar with its origins, and final 
interpretative authority always rests with the mother. The rattle is her unique and personalized 
contribution to the continuing formation of the child outside the womb. It embodies a technology for 
the production of persons founded in the controlled appropriation of alterity in the context of 
companionship.   
 
[INSERT: Figure 2]  
 
 The hammock‟s protective function, epitomized in the sonic transmission of resistance to 
diseases, helps to interpret comments by Urarina that the hammock is not only the baby‟s 
companion (coriara), but also “like its cojoaaorain,” the avian caretaker or spiritual guardian of 
game animals. One informant defined the cojoaaorain as “one who communicates with you in order 
to care for your life…for your defense.” The baby is emotionally as well as physically dependent on 
the hammock, and separation is considered highly distressing, as was first made clear to me when I 
once callously – and ultimately unsuccessfully - attempted to purchase a hammock still in use. The 
baby‟s involvement is further encouraged by the attachment of a series of „toys‟, typically pieces of 
wood carved by the mother for its shadow soul (corii) to „play‟ with. Their location behind the head 
and out of reach reinforces this playing‟s immaterial nature. The most important such „toy‟ is the 
baby‟s own umbilical cord (misi), attached to the rattle carefully wrapped in cloth inside a tiny string 
bag. Treated with great respect by adults, it cannot be touched or removed from the hammock by 
anyone but the child itself, who will ideally dispose of or „lose‟ it in the course of playing. The 
umbilical cord is linguistically indistinct from the placenta (also misi), carefully buried by the mother 
in the same pit into which the baby is born. Because of its enduring connection to the child, 
accidental contact with an animal or harmful spirit is feared to result in illness. The spirit or shadow 
soul is said to return to the placenta and umbilical cord after death, and their careful burial enables it 
to find and identify its family and birthplace, establishing a localized continuity between the womb 
and the afterlife. A spirit unable to find its umbilical cord and placenta is condemned to eternal 
wandering and discontent.   
 The canaanai mitu baau quoted above referred to the child‟s spirit growing in the 
hammock “as in the womb,” and a series of additional gestures and ideas point to an implicit analogy 
between the hammock (with rattle) and placenta. Urarina recognize that each becomes an integral 
part of both the mother and child, an extension of their person, and cannot be unambiguously 
interpreted as belonging to either. Much like the placenta, the hammock binds a baby to its mother 
and mediates between them; hence the encouraging references (in lullabies and elsewhere) to the 
hammock as a means for prolonging their union. It must similarly be carefully protected against 
accidental contact with alterity due to a quasi-material connection with the baby. An empty 
hammock is always untied and laid on the floor, lest the spirits of deceased children enter and swing 
in it, inducing vomiting, diarrhea and fever. The hammock fully contains the baby in a protective and 
nurturing space which facilitates growth, much like the womb, and the extensive collection of hollow 
seeds, gourds and empty bottles on the rattle would further suggest this relation of containment. Use 
of the hammock in daily life effectively serves to prolong the experience of intra-uterine life. Safely 
inside, the baby dwells in a sonic universe circumscribed by the sounds of the rattle, and is insulated 
physically and symbolically from the outside world. Perhaps most importantly, the rapid swinging 
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motion, which ideally extends to near-horizontal, subdues the child by resisting and ultimately 
overriding its tentative exercise of agency. A baby in a hammock is rarely spoken to, outside the 
lullaby, and in this subordinate, ideally sleeping, dependent state is best protected and most 
receptive to the formative messages which inaugurate it as person and subject.  
 
A Tamed Enemy: The Stone Bowl 
 
 At the other end of the life trajectory, experienced shamans wishing to increase their control 
over the dart-like media (batohi) of mystical attack engage in intimate companionships with small, 
naturally-occurring stone bowls known as egaando. Like the baby and its hammock, the two come 
to share a similar if asymmetrical mode of social existence in which each productively transforms the 
other through communication and substantive exchange. But it is here the shaman who must wield 
greater authority in order to utilize the egaando and coerce it into full personhood. Such a task is 
considered both difficult and dangerous, given the egaando‟s renowned hostility and formidable 
abilities to ensorcel, even when lying undiscovered in rocky stretches of river bed. Babies and small 
children are particularly susceptible, often through the conduit of their parents‟ activities, and the 
resulting illnesses can be cured only by means of baau chants which, like the canaanai mitu baau 
used for preparing the child and hammock (and like the operation of the rattle itself) aim to integrate 
desired qualities into the child from diverse sources. A series of beings noted for their immunity to 
attack by egaando are invoked in turn:  
 
 In our river basin that has rocky rapids lauri conucue cocaratiri 
 As his father looks at the egaando   begaando que nenotajina rai jojiara  
 With its terrifying power    ne jana rai beluna que  
 The egaando looks at his father  nenotajina rai jojiara ne jana  
 His blood will be dyed    rai coichana lomoritiin 
 By the blessed contents of this bowl   nia rai cojoachacane jana  
 Harm never ever befalls    unaterinachara  
 The offspring of the giant otter   asae aroba necoerejete 
 
 [Entire verse repeats replacing ‘giant otter’/‘asae aroba’ successively with:] 
 
 otter chief      asisi jelai tijiain 
 tapir       caoacha ate cosemane    
 water jaguar      asae baain 
 water thunder people    asae araracuru   
 ponpon duck      jojona 
  
 At this point in time the egaando is little more than a hostile concentration of will and 
„fearfulness‟ or predatory energy (comaaori). Although occupying a „point of view‟, capable of 
causing harm by „looking‟, its status as a person is ambiguous, diffuse and devoid of individual 
identity. It is not readily distinguished as an entity separate from the rocky rapid in which it rests, nor 
from their shared Mother or Owner, who has both spiritual and locational aspect (respectively 
caratiri neba, “mother of rocky rapids,” and nacanocari, a kind of alligator). All are thought to 
collaborate in joint acts of predatory aggression. Even more significantly, the egaando dwells 
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hitherto outside the moral sphere, which over and above all else instantiates the divide between 
humanity and animality, or between „real people‟ and others.  
 To utilize an egaando one must first capture and “tame” it (irilaa). A suitable specimen, 
sought out in times of low water level, is around 5-10 cm in diameter, with two depressions in its 
base, said to resemble the testicles of the white-lipped peccary. One woman described her late 
husband‟s egaando as being “very pretty” with natural designs on it similar to those painted by 
women on the ceremonial ceramic jars (baichaje) used for storing ayahuasca (Banisteriopsis 
caapi). Once found, a shaman immediately blows tobacco smoke on the bowl and places it at the 
foot of a toé tree (Brugmansia sp.), where its co-operation is gradually enlisted through forms of 
ritual dialogue (cojiotaa and chairetaa). The Mother of toé and the egaando are directly 
addressed in turn, in their potential capacity as subjects, with the aim of soliciting assistance, 
subduing the egaando and instigating asymmetrical relationships of companionship between the 
three participants, though without any recourse to external relations of transference: 
  
 Tame this egaando for me, toé   Ca egaando carai irilaara coaairi 
 Let your greatness be with him, toé   aiyute coaairi neeine necaoacha 
 Be at his side, accompanying   jereronia neeine 
 Speak to this egaando     ca egaando naainte 
 Our ancestors prayed to you    cojiotaaure cana inoaesiuru  
 Do as before, that we shall replace them  charijieenteeinte aiachuruine 
 Yes indeed, as I drink    aiyute necocaae nianone 
 Let‟s accompany each other   canu necoca jeeune neeine 
 Just like this, egaando    cairijitocora egaando 
 You are just like this     cairijitocote  
 With this greatness of toé   ca coaairi necaoacha aina 
 Be like this greatness of toé   cairijitocotee coaairi necaoacha 
 You will accompany me, egaando  jereronia neeincha egaando 
  
 After several days at the foot of the toé tree, the bowl is transferred to a baichaje jar and 
brought inside the house. Some claim the jar should be filled with water, to be changed every few 
days, for if the bowl dries out it is liable to „run away‟ or ensorcel those in its immediate proximity. 
In further chants addressed to the egaando, the shaman requests it in his new capacity as „owner‟ to 
serve him obediently, to respect his family and not cause them harm, and to share its knowledge. 
Silent at first, the egaando eventually capitulates to the requests in toé visions. It is used as a vessel 
for drinking concentrated tobacco juice, ingested continuously in conjunction with tobacco smoke. 
The shaman must learn to listen to the egaando‟s darts, which sing their songs „through‟ him as he 
drinks the tobacco juice: 
 
 Egaando, egaando, egaando   egaando egaando egaando 
 Laying out flat     mariri mariri mariri 
 Emptying out asara darts    asara ne coberotee 
 You are laying your eggs egaando   netajetia neeine egaando 
 Reproducing, increasing in number  necalabihaca 
 Let us play and sing here   nenatia cute 
 With the tobacco drinker    tabaquero aina 
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 Your forces will come to stay  cojoatojoi uureen nedareen 
 Sing of this      nenatia caa ne te 
 The theme of playing, also a feature of the baby‟s relation with the rattle, is emphasized here 
as in much shamanic discourse. Play is pivotal in the consolidation of social relationships, and 
references a productive, if incorporeal, interaction which generates affective closeness. My informant 
explained as follows: “The shaman is getting drunk with the tobacco juice, and also with the darts, he 
is playing with the darts, going around and around for fun...both sides are playing, together with 
egaando, they are all playing. The darts are making him sing. The darts are always singing. 
Wherever they are, they always have to demonstrate their manner.” Said to resemble tiny worms, 
the darts are full of life (ichaoha), playful as well as lethal. The egaando “lays eggs” in the song in 
order “to have grandchildren,” “to increase its numbers,” and through these songs, through play, the 
darts are said to “empty out” into the shaman and multiply.  
 In exchange for the bowl‟s continued co-operation, the shaman submits to stringent dietary 
and other prohibitions. He avoids salt and animals with strong colors or designs, among other items, 
which cause the egaando‟s darts to “flee in fear.” He leads a solitary existence, eating and sleeping 
alone, approached only by others on the same diet. The material basis of his connection to the group 
effectively severed, he is free to “become like the egaando” and communicate with it more 
effectively. One dieting with egaando is said to resemble a convalescent, physically weak and 
incapable of hard work. The bowl is placed by his head when he sleeps, and will approach him in 
his dreams, interrogating his motives for seeking it out and dieting with it. He will be asked about his 
wife, children, and relatives, and the bowl may make clear its desire to inflict harm, to “eat the liver” 
of one of them, for example. The shaman must have mastered the art of dreaming in order to 
dissuade it and contain its aggressive instincts. One who lacks mastery of the relevant chants, or the 
discipline to diet properly, will similarly be unsuccessful in restraining it. One woman recalled how 
her father possessed an egaando when she was small, but was unable to tame it, and her brother 
became gravely ill and nearly died as a result. 
 Rigorous adherence to the diet becomes a form of leverage in such oneiric transactions for 
ensuring the bowl‟s continued co-operation. To the extent the shaman‟s family stay in good health, 
the egaando is considered to be upholding its end of the bargain, its ability to keep to its word 
indicating that the taming is proceeding well. After months of dieting the bowl finally enters the moral 
universe, respectful and obedient, sharing a close affinity with its owner. “A good egaando loves its 
owner,” I was told, and “is like a teacher in the school,” instructing him until he becomes a true 
benane – one with the facility to extract darts from an ensorcelled patient and redeploy them in 
retributive action. Such figures are the cornerstone of shamanic ideology and continue to command a 
sense of awe and a prominent place in everyday discourse that seems disproportionate with their 
now dwindling numbers. Possession of an egaando, the hallmark of the benane, is enshrouded in a 
kind of pseudo-secrecy, the topic of covert discussions which better promote a suitable aura of fear 
than any open advertisement. One informant recalled that his grandfather, after many months of 
dieting with egaando, had successfully tamed it to the point where he could communicate with it in 
an everyday, waking, non-ritual context. He taught his egaando to watch over and protect his house 
while he traveled upriver on hunting trips, instructing it to „insult‟, in their dreams, any passing 
travelers tempted to sleep in the house. Persons so insulted have been known to leap up from their 
beds, shouting, running out of the house into the night. If they know how to dream, they will have 




Gender and the Production of Subjects 
 
 Procedures for the fabrication and use of the hammock and egaando reference contrastive 
and complementary techniques for bringing into being determinate kinds of person. Common to both 
is an intimate and mutually constitutive, but ultimately asymmetrical, relationship which is valued 
particularly for its ability to form or enhance personal identity through the inculcation of essential 
skills and other qualities. Use of things to this end circumvents an egalitarian ethos according to 
which direct instruction by one‟s fellows is considered an undesirable imposition of authority. Just as 
the hammock‟s own agency necessarily exceeds that of the baby in order to effectively imbue it with 
the requisite qualities of a gendered, social person, the egaando is fully subjectivized only when and 
as the shaman successfully establishes his complete authority over it. As Erikson (this volume) has 
observed, the fact that something has a master in Amazonia does not impede its endowal with 
personality and intentionality. The cases developed here would even point to the former as a 
prerequisite of the latter, an apparent paradox which recalls recent inquiry into how “the subject is 
not only that which is oppressed by power but emerges himself as the product of this power” (Žižek 
2000: 251). The techniques for preparing and using an egaando, which encapsulate an Urarina 
theory of subjection, will be used to explore this further. 
 The egaando‟s progression from an unpredictable predatory force to a pet-like subordinate 
imbued with personality and a moral conscience is glossed by Urarina as the outcome of irilaa, a 
term used to mean “taming” or “raising,” for example pets or orphans. Several authors have related 
taming to the conversion of affinity into consanguinity, and encompassed it within the structural logic 
of predation (e.g. Fausto 2000, 2007; Taylor 2001; Descola 1997). Yet there is little to suggest the 
egaando‟s initial status as an affine, while its eventual relation to its owner was articulated in terms of 
the two being not like kin, but “like neighbors,” and sharing not bodily substance, but mutual respect. 
Ideologies of predation and, especially, warfare are moreover far from salient in Urarina thought and 
practice, which emphasise peacefulness and passive forms of resistance over bellicose action. They 
figure as themes primarily in historical accounts of themselves as the innocent victims of Jivaroan 
raiding parties. Whilst concurring with Fausto (2000: 938) that “adoptive filiation” references 
prototypical relations of symbolic control in Amazonia, I suggest that taming can here be largely 
dissociated from warfare and predation and instead incorporated within a broader matrix of 
subjection, implying the simultaneous subordination and forming of subjects. 
 Taming comprises firstly the deployment of ritual discourse which demands the egaando‟s 
co-operation. Working in alliance with the Mother of toé, revered for its unrivalled power, the 
shaman occupies an clear position of authority. The egaando‟s eventual response is said to be a 
kind of capitulation, a recognition of the power of those who call it. We might say that it is hailed or 
interpellated into existence as a subject2. In aligning itself with authority and responding to its 
demands, the egaando is endowed with a moral conscience. It agrees to teach the shaman and 
promises not to harm his family, despite its desire to do so, and the shaman in return undertakes to 
diet. Demonstrating an ability to keep to its word is highly significant in the construal of the 
egaaando as a moral person, rather than a mere concentration of dangerous predatory energy. As 
Nietzsche (1956:190) pointed out, one who promises must be able to forge a continuity between an 
original determination and the actual performance of the thing willed, or between a statement and an 
act, across a time gap in which various other, competing circumstances or temptations might threaten 
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to intervene. This protracted will enables the promising being to stand for itself through time. The 
deal struck with the egaando demands the suppression of its instinct to inflict harm and the adoption 
of social norms, such as respect for others and personal responsibility. It is this good moral sense 
that makes the egaando most like a “true person” (cacha). From an Urarina point of view, it would 
seem that its newfound “consciousness”, as represented by its ability to enter into increasingly 
coherent dialogues, is not somehow transfered or “captured” from its owner (cf. Gell 1998), but is 
rather the form its own will takes, its innate hostility or predatory force, when prevented from simple 
expression as a deed. It is an aggression turned inward and back on itself, an internalization which 
creates an autonomous, internal space, producing conscience and the conditions for reflexivity.  
 Urarina claim that a tamed egaando is not only possessed of moral sensibilities, and able to 
cooperate with others, but is highly dependent on, and fiercely loyal to, even “loving”, its owner and 
master. What might be the significance of this newfound emotional bond? If the egaando‟s identity 
as a person or subject was, from the very beginning, founded in a kind of “recognition” by and 
submission to an authority figure on whom it depended in every sense, then to embrace that 
submission, to form a “passionate attachment” to subjection (Butler 1997), is equivalent to 
embracing the very conditions of its continued existence. The situation of the baby in its hammock, 
though admittedly a more complex case, does not necessarily differ in general outline from this 
scenario. The baby experiences its physical dependency on the hammock as an intense emotional 
bond. Only specialized chants (cojiotaa) can placate a crying baby estranged from its hammock.  
The rattle‟s gentle messages, which shape and condition its new, human identity, are similarly from a 
protective authority who offers personalized recognition, but to whom submission is mandatory. The 
skills for achieving personal autonomy later in life can only be acquired through a kind of founding 
submission to a situation of dependency and attachment.  
 Such an account of the journey of the subject, although somewhat stylized, is at variance 
with perspectivist assumptions. Egaando are indeed considered to be alive, to possess animal or 
vegetal souls (or both), and a Mother/Owner, yet such attributions would seem almost incidental to 
their gradual positioning as subjects. The ability to occupy a „point of view‟ does not guarantee or 
index personhood, and their changing subjectivity relies not on a soul or body but on shifting 
relations to its Owners and Masters. This opens up important questions of variation foreclosed by 
the perspectivist recourse to overarching inversions: how and why, for example, animism and 
perspectivism are not unilaterally applied to nonhumans and may often be restricted to particular 
species, “those which perform a key symbolic and practical role” (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 471). 
This in turn suggests an alternative conceptualization of the Mother/Owner figure, whom Viveiros de 
Castro has claimed functions as a hypostatization of the species with which it is associated, creating 
an “intersubjective field for human-animal relations” (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 471; see also Fausto 
2007). Such a formulation conflates rather than problematizes the relation between the individual, its 
species and their Mother or Owner. If the egaando and its Mother/Owner are referred to 
interchangeably when the former is still in the river, this is patently not the case once it is extracted, 
where the egaando alone is addressed directly.  
 In Urarina thought, anything with „power‟ or „force‟ of some kind, whether to smell sweetly 
or burn fiercely, cause harm or inebriate, typically has a Mother or Owner with which this power is 
principally associated or identified. But despite this ostensibly offensive role, the Mother/Owner is 
often described as an entity‟s „defense‟, the power on which it depends for continued existence. It 
might more accurately be figured as a hypostatization of at once the power or „voice‟ of authority 
which is the condition of subjectivity, constituted in relationship, and an individual‟s incipient 
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conscience, for these are at first necessarily indistinguishable.3 The taming of the egaando is the 
occasion for the definitive conversion of the former into the latter, as the shaman assumes full control 
and ownership. The category of the subject emerges here as less a location or „point of view‟, than a 
kind of „transfer point‟ of attachments and dependencies. Shifts in these - often, though not always, 
expressed in bodily modifications or transformations – would account for the variable and 
sometimes transient nature of subjectivity. The Amazonian concern with establishing individual rights 
of ownership over everything –  including their “quest for non-overlapping mastership” (Erikson, this 
volume) is evidently bound up in the equally characteristic “radical subjectivization” (García Hierro 
& Surrallés 2004: 15) of non-humans, and each in a sense implies the other.4  
 A few observations concerning gender are apposite here. Insofar as the hammock and 
egaando are conceived by Urarina as agents for the instruction and transformation of humans, this 
agency manifests itself as feminine and masculine respectively. The hammock materializes a mother‟s 
love for her baby, along with her relations with female kin and their collective desires for its future 
identity, and connects the two in a manner reminiscent of the placenta. Through the assembly of 
items of diverse origin into a single, harmonious whole, its use „normalizes‟ the child and 
incorporates it into social life. Women‟s labor is often similarly integrative in nature, and women 
themselves play an integrative role in the uxorilocal structure of Urarina society, consolidating the 
domestic unit and incorporating incoming men into the household. The hammock assumes a motherly 
and caring role, literally forming the child‟s body as it nurtures, protects and regulates. Its use 
emphasizes the importance of integrative change in the establishment of social relations, of proximity 
and mutual dependency over individuality and hierarchy, and reproduces the authority of women in 
the domestic spheres of bodily and child care. Men rarely touch let alone swing a hammock, and 
claim to have little or no knowledge of their own child‟s rattle or its origins, deferring all questions on 
the matter to their wives. 
 Use of the egaando implies techniques of empowerment of a masculine nature. It is not 
manufactured or assembled, but found fully formed, in the shape of peccary testicles, albeit in a 
„wild‟ state and in need of taming. Men are said to have to „tame‟ their wives at the outset of 
marriage, in order that they assume a new, domestic identity as a wife – a task further assisted, on 
occasion, by forms of ritual discourse. The egaando emphasizes relations with alterity over 
domesticity, the power of change through discipline and internal transformation, and is individuating 
and differentiating in nature, enhancing a man‟s social status and promoting the singularity proper to 
shamans and to men in general. Through ways of dressing, naming practices, forms of address, and 
a variety of behavioral norms, women are symbolically homogenized in daily life, whereas men 
actively differentiate themselves. Urarina theories of gestation state that men contribute the 
„uniqueness‟ of a fetus, those features which distinguish it from others, while women provide the 
vessel for growth and formation. In short, the two objects are implicitly gendered as they are 
socialized. This suggests possible limits to the perspectivist definition of humanity solely in 
contradistinction to animality, which fails to differentiate between the male and female person (Rival 
2007). Of course, gender is also an indispensable conceptual and analogic tool for imagining other 
forms of relation (Hugh-Jones, this volume; Strathern 2001). The gendered agentivity of these two 
things, which captures or reiterates that of its makers or owners, further highlights the intimate 
connection between autonomy and dependency, or between the power that acts on a subject and 
brings it into being, and that which the subject in turn enacts.   
 Notions of personhood form part of the ways by which actors legitimize their own actions in 
relation to others (Conklin & Morgan 1996: 658). As vested interests inform the full or partial 
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recognition as persons of things in specific contexts, use of the hammock and egaando serve to 
further the authority of women and men in distinct spheres of action.  They may be understood as 
partaking in, and promoting, contrastive and co-existing models of personhood and agency. The 
selective application of such models to non-humans recalls the concept of „nature regimes‟ (Escobar 
1999), which are further articulated in opposition to the naturalistic and capitalist „natures‟ imported 
from elsewhere. Yet beneath these differences lie significant commonalities, and each model 
demonstrates above all the importance assigned to things in the work of producing persons. Things, 
like persons, may inhabit an autonomy born of dependency, an often ambiguous form of relationality 
perfectly encapsulated by the image of the hammock as placenta. This is envisaged, not as a 
property of the body, but as a potential of the spirit or shadow soul. What is being strived for, it 
seems, is not the identity of kinship but a kind of similarity or proximity, dyadic in nature, grounded 
in irreducible difference. While the Urarina theory of materiality manifests a sense of ownership or 
mastery as being of central importance in relations with things, it simultaneously holds that 
fabrication, even when symbolically equated with filiation (Lagrou, this volume), is not the only 
means for its establishment, nor that of an equally important intimacy. Neither the baby nor the 
shaman themselves manufacture the objects with which they become entangled, though they are 
deeply involved in their creation as person-like companions. Things and persons may be mutually 
constituted, but it is through subjection, so often under the guise of companionship, that subjects 










1. Foreign goods such as radios or shotguns are not exempt from this logic, though they are sharply 
distinguished from locally manufactured items in at least one aspect: their Mother and Owner, source 
and ultimate destiny is Moconajaera, a figure today equated by Urarina with the devil, and who is 
said to burn souls in the celestial fire in order to purge them of sins and in accordance with the 
quantities consumed of „his‟ goods. 
2. In Althusser‟s (1971) well-known, allegorical example, a policeman hails a passerby on the 
street, calling, “Hey, you!”. As the passerby turns, in that instant recognizing himself as the one who 
is addressed, interpellation – the discursive production of the social subject – takes place. 
Recognition by the Law is proffered and accepted, and an identity is won by accepting the 
subordination and normalization effected by that „voice‟ (see also Butler 1997). 
3. As Butler (1997) has pointed out, there must be an irreducible ambiguity between the „voice‟ of 
conscience and the „voice‟ of the law if models of ideological interpellation are to avoid assumptions 
of any prior subject who performs the allegorical „turn‟ towards the voice which hails it. A 
antecedent complicity with authority – such as that potentially encapsulated in the Mother/Owner 
figure - is needed to explain why the individual responds at all.  
4. Urarina are, of course, both masters and subjects in this matrix of symbolic control. Incidentally, 
one Urarina word for Mother/Owner, ijiaene, is virtually identical to that for mestizo, ijiaaen, a 
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mutually reinforcing assimilation which may reflect not simply an earlier sense of mestizos as spirits, 
but their originary and continuing presence in Urarina territory in structural positions of authority and 
ownership. It is tempting to speculate that the continuing and often seemingly voluntary assumption 
by Urarina of subordinate roles in relation to mestizos – in the still-pervasive system of habilitación, 
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Figure 2:  Rattle comprising seeds and gourds woven together with miscellaneous animal 
parts and foreign goods 
 
